This study on Monitoring Influence and Disinformation Campaigns in the Western Balkans (MEDIWEB) builds on the European External Action Service’s (EEAS) understanding of the growing political and security challenges posed by foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) to the European Union (EU). Conducted with funding from the German Federal Foreign Office, it aims to identify and analyse FIMI in the Western Balkans. This endeavour seeks to enhance the comprehension of both policymakers and members of civil society. This should facilitate a more targeted and effective response to FIMI and address the vulnerabilities in all aspects of democratic governance and institutions in this region of geopolitical importance for the EU.

ISD’s research has found that pro-Kremlin media outlets are actively engaging in topics highly relevant to Kosovo, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. We collected data from four media outlets based in Serbia and the Bosnian Serb entity, Republika Srpska, including their corresponding channels on Facebook and Instagram, which had a collective follower base of 431,197. According to media monitoring from the Center for Research, Transparency and Accountability (CRTA), an independent civil society organisation in Belgrade, Russian media accounts for 9% of the disinformation sources in Serbia across selected national TV channels, daily newspapers and online portals.Among the study’s key findings are the following:

• In the Western Balkans, most disinformation is amplified and disseminated by politicians and media outlets linked to political parties in the region. Although disinformation is often framed as a threat from abroad to governance and democratic processes, ISD research reveals that the primary sources are found within the region itself: presidents, prime ministers, party presidents, or editors-in-chief.
• Various local and international entities were observed to employ disinformation tactics to erode the EU’s standing in the Western Balkans. They exploit and distort the rift between ‘EU idealists’—those steadfast in their nation’s European identity and prospective future—and ‘EU realists’, who, while not against EU integration, remain sceptical about its feasibility.
• Communities in the studied countries have become increasingly EU-sceptic over time. This negative trend can be seen in the way public support for EU membership has declined over the last ten years, from around 70-80% down to around 50% in most cases; in Serbia it is as low as 38%.
• One of the main reasons for this growing EU-scepticism, anti-EU and pro-Russian atmosphere is found in the region’s political rulers and ruling elites who undermine fundamental democratic processes. While some politicians claim to support EU accession, many are actively working to obstruct necessary EU reforms and harmonisation of foreign policy with the bloc.